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Fix the Patent Laws, a coalition of 40 patient groups, was launched in 
2011 by the Treatment Action Campaign, SECTION27 and Doctors 
Without Borders to advocate for reform of South Africa (SA)’s patent 
laws to fully adopt safeguards provided under the Agreement on 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). As 
a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) and a middle-
income country, SA is required by TRIPS to provide 20 years of patent 
protection on novel innovations. While TRIPS sets out standards of 
protection that WTO members are required to provide, it also contains 
safeguards (also known as flexibilities) that countries can adopt in 
national laws and implement in their countries to protect health.
The right of countries to adopt health safeguards in their national 
patent laws and the importance of their use in promoting and securing 
access to medicines have been reaffirmed in many international 
fora. In 2001, members of the WTO adopted the Doha Declaration 
on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health (Doha Declaration), 
stating that ‘the [TRIPS] Agreement can and should be interpreted 
and implemented in a manner supportive of WTO Members’ right 
to protect public health and, in particular, to promote access to 
medicines for all’.[1] The World Health Organization has passed 
several resolutions affirming the rights of countries to use TRIPS 
safeguards to improve medicine access.[2] And in 2016, the United 
Nations High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines stated that ‘WTO 
members should make full use of [TRIPS] flexibilities as confirmed 
by the Doha Declaration to promote access to health technologies 
when necessary’.[3]
Despite the repeated assertion in international fora regarding the 
importance of including health safeguards in patent laws and the 
right of countries to do so, few countries have fully adopted them 
into their national laws. TRIPS-compliant middle-income countries 
in particular have faced significant pressure against the adoption and 
use of these safeguards. Pressure tactics have included legal challenges 
by multinational pharmaceutical companies, as well as political and 
trade pressure by wealthy countries seeking to bolster pharmaceutical 
sales and profits in middle-income country markets.[3]
In this article we explore how the lack of health safeguards in SA’s 
patent laws negatively impact on medicine access and discuss the 
need for urgent reform of the country’s patent laws and procedures 
as committed to in the recent intellectual property (IP) policy. Health 
safeguards considered in the article include patentability criteria, 
substantive examination and opposition procedures, and compulsory 
licensing.
Patent data provided in this article were sourced from the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission, the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation and Medspal’s online patent 
databases, as well as patent data and analyses supplied by I-MAK 
and the Medicines Patent Pool. Pricing data were sourced from the 
Medicines Price Registry (for SA) and 1mg.com (for India). India was 
selected as a pricing comparator country because historically it has 
progressively adopted TRIPS health safeguards into its national laws, 
and because it is a leading global supplier of generic medicines.[4]
All patent and pricing data used in this article were extracted 
between May and July 2018 and can be reviewed in Annexure 1 
(http://bit.ly/2SNu9pN).
Patentability criteria
While primary patents are generally granted on a medicine’s base 
compound or biological molecule, secondary patents can be granted 
on a range of claims including derivatives, formulations, dosages, 
combinations, uses and production processes. The strategy of 
extending patent monopoly lengths through secondary patent claims 
is commonly known as ‘patent evergreening’.
Studies have demonstrated rising rates of secondary patenting 
of medicines following TRIPS adoption in 1995.[5-7] According to 
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a pharmaceutical sector inquiry by the European Commission, 
secondary patenting of medicines skyrocketed in the 1990s as part 
of a ‘toolbox’ of strategies employed by pharmaceutical companies to 
extend their commercial monopolies beyond 20 years.[5]
The UN High-Level Panel on Access to Medicines recently 
stated that ‘secondary patents can create legal uncertainty around 
the patent status of a health technology, which in turn discourages 
entities from procuring generic versions of products for fear of patent 
infringement’.[3]
While TRIPS requires that countries provide 20 years of patent 
protection on products and processes that are ‘new, involve an 
inventive step and are capable of industrial application’, it provides the 
leeway for countries to define what is meant by these three terms[8] in 
establishing their national patentability criteria. Patentability criteria 
are the requirements that applicants must meet to be eligible for 
patent protection. To date, a number of countries, including India[9] 
and Argentina,[10] have adopted strong patentability criteria to combat 
patent evergreening.
SA’s recently adopted IP policy stated that ‘patentability criteria 
will be developed in order to promote genuine innovation through 
the patent system in South Africa’;[11] however, it does not provide 
guidance on the patentability of common secondary applications. 
Currently SA does not have explicit criteria for the granting of 
patents, which creates significant legal ambiguity regarding the 
patentability of weak secondary claims. The IP policy, however, 
provides a valuable opportunity to clarify patentability criteria to 
prevent patent evergreening in the upcoming process of policy 
implementation and law reform.
Substantive examination and 
opposition procedures
TRIPS further provides for countries and jurisdictions to adopt 
and implement substantive examination procedures to ensure that 
patentability criteria are met prior to the granting of patents. 
Currently, patents are granted in SA via a ‘depository system’. Under 
such a system, patents are granted on all applications for which forms 
are correctly filed and fees are paid without substantive examination 
of the application’s merits.[12] As a result, SA commonly grants many 
patents that are rejected or withdrawn in other jurisdictions where 
substantive examination of patent applications is conducted.
A review of the outcome of matching pharmaceutical patent 
applications filed in different jurisdictions found that SA is an outlier 
with regard to its high patent grant rate. Sampat and Shadlen[13] 
reported that on matching patent applications filed between 2000 and 
2002, SA granted 93% of patents applied for, v. 61% in the USA, 51% 
in Europe and 29% in Japan. They also noted that ‘since South Africa 
does not examine applications, the only applications not granted 
there are those withdrawn during the examination process due to 
failure to pay issue fees, and (a very small number) applications still 
pending’.[13]
A further shortcoming of SA’s current laws and procedures 
for granting patents is the lack of patent opposition procedures. 
Patent opposition procedures are commonly used by patents offices 
(including in the USA,[14] India (Patents Act 39 of 1970,[9] Section 25), 
Argentina,[15] South Korea[16] and the EU[17]) to allow third parties to 
challenge the validity of patent applications prior to and/or after their 
granting.[18]
Currently the only way to oppose a patent in SA is by undertaking 
litigation – generally a lengthy and prohibitively expensive process.[19] 
Yet, research by Fix the Patent Laws and the Cancer Alliance shows 
that patent litigation is rare in SA in comparison with countries with 
larger pharmaceutical markets.[20,21] Further, when litigation does 
occur, SA’s courts typically rule conservatively, applying a low bar 
for novelty and inventiveness and erring in favour of upholding the 
patent holder’s protections over public interest.[22-24]
Importantly, the recent IP policy approved by Cabinet called for 
the adoption of substantive examination and opposition procedures 
starting from introducing third-party observations and post-grant 
administrative reviews.[11] However, the policy did not provide clear 
time frames for implementing these procedures and noted that a 
third-party observation system may be implemented as an interim 
measure prior to the establishment of opposition procedures. 
A third-party observation would allow third parties to provide 
information to the patents office assessing the patentability of 
applications and validity of patent claims against the criteria, but 
would not trigger formal procedures involving the third party. 
While the interim consideration offers a positive opportunity to 
start establishing the mechanism of opposition, a clearer timeline of 
implementation is important to prevent further delays in reforming 
practices.
Compulsory licensing
Arguably, one of the most important health safeguards provided for 
under TRIPS is the ability of WTO members to grant compulsory 
licensing without the consent of the patent holders, on the grounds 
defined by national laws, in order to use an invention or allow its 
use by a third party.[25] Unlike voluntary licences, which are granted 
by the patent holder, a compulsory licence is a licence granted by a 
competent public authority or court that allows for the manufacture, 
marketing, import and export of generic products with royalty 
payments to the patent holder.
TRIPS provides for the granting of compulsory licences to protect 
health, and the Doha Declaration[1] clearly affirms the freedom of 
countries to determine the grounds for issuing compulsory licences 
(paragraph 5(b)). The importance of utilising this flexibility was 
recently reaffirmed by the UN High-Level Panel on Access to 
Medicines, which stated that ‘[c]ompulsory licenses are an important 
policy tool for government authorities to promote access to health 
technologies’.[3]
To date, SA has not utilised this important flexibility owing to a 
combination of unworkable domestic legal procedures for issuing 
compulsory licences[26] and international pressure against their use.[27] 
While SA has never issued a compulsory licence on a pharmaceutical 
product, this flexibility has been used repeatedly in other jurisdictions 
to facilitate generic medicine access.[28]
Importantly, SA’s recently adopted IP policy committed to the 
adoption of ‘more effective and efficient’  mechanisms for granting 
compulsory licences in SA to facilitate the use of this flexibility to 
protect public health.
Medicine case studies
We provide four medicine case studies, on lenalidomide, entecavir, 
erlotinib and sorafenib, to illustrate how concrete reform of SA’s 
patent law can facilitate greater medicine access and equity between 
the public and private health sectors. The lenalidomide, entecavir 
and erlotinib case studies highlight how the adoption of strong 
patentability criteria, as well as substantive examination and 
opposition procedures, would reduce the granting of secondary 
patents and allow for earlier access to more affordable generic 
products. The sorafenib case study highlights how compulsory 
licensing can be applied when granted patents inhibit access owing to 
excessive pricing of patented products or other challenges.
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The case studies are drawn from two reports published by Fix the 
Patent Laws, Doctors Without Borders and the Cancer Alliance 
that provide patient stories and medicine examples highlighting the 
negative impact of SA’s patent laws on medicine access and patients’ 
lives.[29,30] Patent data provided in this article have been updated with 
additional patent data sourced from Unitaid’s Medspal database and 
provided by I-MAK following publication of the earlier reports.
Lenalidomide
Lenalidomide is indicated for the treatment of multiple myeloma 
and some types of myelodysplastic syndromes. Base product 
patents were filed on lenalidomide with the international Patent 
Cooperation Treaty in 1997 and 1998 (PCT/US1997/013375, PCT/
US1998/010886). Neither of the base patents was filed in SA; 
however, 32 secondary patents related to lenalidomide filed by 
Celgene were subsequently granted in SA. The majority of secondary 
patents granted on lenalidomide were granted on methods of use, 
including on unapproved indications that were later abandoned given 
lack of efficacy data.
In cross-checking patents granted in SA with matching applications 
sought in other jurisdictions on the World Intellectual Property 
Organization’s Patentscope database, we found that for all patents 
granted on lenalidomide in SA a matching patent application (or 
divisional application thereof) was withdrawn or rejected in at 
least one other jurisdiction (Annexure 1, http://bit.ly/2SNu9pN). 
In other words, many patents granted in SA were rejected in other 
jurisdictions following substantive examination, or granted for a 
smaller scope of protection following rejection of the broader scope 
of protection initially filed.
For multiple myeloma treatment, lenalidomide is generally taken 
for 3 weeks (followed by 1 week off treatment), starting at doses of 
25 mg. In India, where generic lenalidomide is available, a year of 
generic lenalidomide costs ~ZAR31 072. Prior to the registration 
of Celgene’s patented lenalidomide in SA in 2016, a number of 
multiple myeloma patients were able to import generic lenalidomide 
from India with Section 21 authorisation from the Medicines 
Control Council (now the South African Health Products Regulatory 
Authority). However, these authorisations were cancelled following 
the registration of Celgene’s patented product, which is sold in SA 
at ~ZAR729 379 annually – 23 times more than the cost of generics 
in India. With pro bono legal support, the Cancer Alliance has 
assisted previously treated patients in securing further authorisation 
from the South African Health Products Regulatory Authority for 
generic lenalidomide importation. However, new patients in need of 
lenalidomide must pay exorbitant costs for the patented product or 
forgo the treatment.
Lenalidomide is not available in SA’s public sector. Access to the 
lower-cost generic products could expand access in both the private 
and public sectors.
Entecavir
Entecavir is indicated for the treatment of hepatitis B. The primary 
patent granted on entecavir in SA expired in 2011, but a secondary 
patent granted to Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMS) on low-dose 
formulations of entecavir could inhibit the use of generics until 
2021 – an additional 10 years after the primary patent expired. 
The same secondary patent was challenged by Cipla and Natco in 
India, resulting in an out-of-court settlement permitting generic 
manufacture and use.[31]
Entecavir is generally taken for life at daily doses of 0.5 to 1 mg. 
Depending on the dosage needed, a year of BMS’s patented entecavir 
in SA costs ZAR33 354 - 66 695. In India, where generics are available, 
a year of entecavir treatment costs ZAR5 695 - 8 759. Entecavir is not 
available in SA’s public sector unless special permission is granted 
for its procurement via a hospital pharmaceutical therapeutics 
committee.
Erlotinib
Erlotinib is indicated for the treatment of ‘locally advanced or 
meta static adenocarcinoma of the lung after failure of at least one 
prior chemotherapy regimen’.[32] The primary patent granted on 
erlotinib in SA (1996/02522) expired in 2016. However, three 
additional secondary patents granted on erlotinib in SA (2002/03130, 
2005/06339, 2013/08062) on polymorphs, combinations and methods 
of use could extend the monopoly on this medicine until 2032 – 
36 years after the initial patent was granted.
A granted secondary patent (ZA 2002/03130) upheld in SA was 
rejected in India following opposition, allowing for introduction of 
generics.[33] Subsequent litigation related to this and other patents 
granted to Roche on erlotinib in India failed to block the use of 
generics, and was eventually settled out of court.[34,35] Additionally, the 
corresponding combination patent granted in SA (ZA 2013/08062) 
was refused in South Korea[36] and withdrawn in Israel[37] and at the 
European Patents Office.[38]
For the treatment of non-small-cell lung cancer, erlotinib is 
generally taken at daily doses of 150 mg for as long as clinical benefit 
is provided. At this dose, a year of erlotinib treatment in SA, where 
only the patented product is available, costs ZAR317 313. Conversely, 
in India, where generics are already available, a year’s treatment at 
daily doses of 150 mg costs ZAR24 042.
Sorafenib
Sorafenib is indicated for the treatment of advanced renal cell 
carcinoma and advanced inoperable hepatocellular carcinoma. The 
initial patent on sorafenib (ZA 2001/05751) was granted in SA in 
2001. Subsequently, three secondary patents were granted that could 
extend Bayer’s patent monopoly on the medicine until 2026. In 
comparison, the Indian government issued a compulsory licence on 
the initial patent in 2012, allowing for the introduction and use of 
generic products.[39]
Sorafenib is generally taken as a long-term treatment for as long 
as clinical benefit is provided, at a standard dose of 800 mg daily. In 
India, where generics are available, a year of sorafenib treatment costs 
~ZAR16 531. Conversely, in SA, where only patented products are 
available, a year’s treatment costs ZAR333 028 – 20 times more than 
the cost of the generic in India.
Discussion
The medicine examples in this article highlight how the lack of 
strong patentability criteria, examination and opposition procedures 
facilitates high prices and unchecked patent evergreening in SA, 
blocking access to more affordable generic sources for patients in this 
country.[29] Many patents granted in SA were rejected – or granted 
on a smaller scope of protection – following examination and/or 
opposition in other jurisdictions. Secondary patents granted on 
lenalidomide, entecavir and erlotinib could prevent the use of generic 
products in SA for more than 10 years after the initial 20-year period 
of patent protection has ended.
The impact of patent evergreening can have devastating 
consequences for patients. None of the four medicines considered 
in this article is available in the public sector. For all of the 
medicines reviewed, generic products in India are available at 
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fractions (between 5% and 13%) of the 
costs of patented products in SA (Fig. 1). As 
~80% of people living in SA access care via 
the public sector,[40] provision in this sector 
would significantly enhance medicine access 
in the country.
To curb patent evergreening, SA must 
urgently adopt strong patentability criteria, 
combined with substantive examination 
and opposition procedures to ensure that 
patentability criteria are upheld. Further, 
SA should implement efficient compulsory 
licensing procedures to facilitate licensing 
when patents impact negatively on health – 
such as when prices prevent medicine 
provision through the public sector.
Importantly, SA has taken the first step 
towards reforming the country’s patent laws 
to better promote and protect public health 
through the recent adoption of phase 1 of 
a new IP policy. However, the policy lacks 
important technical details (such as criteria 
for pharmaceutical patentability) and will 
require regulatory reforms and/or the 
development of regulations and guidelines 
for its implementation. In the meantime, 
many important medicines such as the case 
study medicines highlighted in this article 
remain inaccessible to most people living in 
the country.
Government must therefore act swiftly 
to protect the health and lives of its citizens 
through urgently converting its policy 
commitments into legislative and procedural 
reforms to fully employ TRIPS safeguards 
in SA.
In addition to the full adoption of TRIPS 
safeguards, government must take measures 
to improve patent transparency in SA. To 
date, Fix the Patent Laws has published 
two reports collectively outlining patent 
landscapes for 30 medicines in SA. Its 
efforts to compile patent landscapes revealed 
the significant complexity of identifying 
relevant and blocking patents on health 
technologies due to inadequate transparency 
requirements of government and efforts by 
companies to create ambiguity within patent 
applications and hide data on pending and 
granted patents.
While it is commendable that SA publi shes 
some patent data on an online searchable 
database,[41] the functioning of this database is 
inadequate for third-party patent monitoring. 
Currently it is extremely difficult for third 
parties to identify all patents related to specific 
health technologies, as patent applicants are 
not required to put the name of the relevant 
health technology in the patent application 
name or summary. Companies commonly 
avoid doing this to create ambiguity in patent 
applications and hide data on pending and 
granted patents. Government should require 
that companies disclose the international 
non-proprietary names (INNs) of relevant 
medicines in patent application titles. In cases 
where the INN has not yet been established, 
governments can require that companies 
retroactively provide these names.
A further complexity of undertaking 
patent landscapes is challenges in estab-
lishing whether or not patents related to 
health technologies are in fact blocking. 
In some cases this can only be established 
after a generic company seeks to launch its 
product at risk or legally challenge a related 
patent in court: the court will then establish 
whether the patent is blocking. To facilitate 
third parties (including patient groups, 
competitors and purchasers) in assessing 
whether or not patents are blocking, 
government should include requirements 
for meaningful titles on patent applications, 
publish clear patentability criteria, and 
provide full patent applications on an online 
searchable database (currently only a cover 
page and summary of the application is 
available). Government should also require 
that companies provide the outcomes of 
matching applications in other jurisdictions 
and make these data publicly available.
Greater transparency of patent data is 
necessary to facilitate patent oppositions 
by third parties. It also creates a clearer link 
between patients, medicines and patents, 
which is necessary to informing the creation 
of policy and legislation that upholds the 
constitutional rights of people living in SA.
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